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Under standard models of expected utility, preferences over stochastic events are
assumed to be independent of the source of uncertainty. Thus, in decision-making,
an agent should exhibit consistent preferences, regardless of whether the uncertainty
derives from the unpredictability of a random process or the unpredictability of a
social partner. However, when a social partner is the source of uncertainty, social
preferences can influence decisions over and above pure risk attitudes (RA). Here, we
compared risk-related hemodynamic activity and individual preferences for two sets of
options that differ only in the social or non-social nature of the risk. Risk preferences
in social and non-social contexts were systematically related to neural activity during
decision and outcome phases of each choice. Individuals who were more risk averse
in the social context exhibited decreased risk-related activity in the amygdala during
non-social decisions, while individuals who were more risk averse in the non-social context
exhibited the opposite pattern. Differential risk preferences were similarly associated
with hemodynamic activity in ventral striatum at the outcome of these decisions. These
findings suggest that social preferences, including aversion to betrayal or exploitation by
social partners, may be associated with variability in the response of these subcortical
regions to social risk.
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INTRODUCTION
A basic assumption of standard utility models (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944) is that choices over uncertain outcomes
are (or should be) completely uninfluenced by the source of the
uncertainty. In other words, what matters is the distribution of
previous outcomes and not the mechanism through which these
outcomes were generated. For instance, faced with an investment
option known to yield a 10% return, an agent should make the
same investment decision regardless of whether the historical out-
comes were determined by a die roll, a roulette wheel, a horse race,
a market, or a human partner.
Trusting a social partner can be approached as a form of social
investment involving risk. Certainly, trust implies investing a val-
ued resource (be it money, time, emotions, or social capital) in
another person or group, usually with the hope of reciprocation
in the same or other form (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988). Thus,
decisions to trust a social partner might be influenced by one’s
general attitude toward risk and be expected to scale with risk
attitudes (RA) measured in non-social contexts. While a number
of behavioral studies have provided empirical support for such
a relationship (Karlan, 2005; Schechter, 2007), other work has
suggested otherwise (Eckel andWilson, 2004; Houser et al., 2010).
Trust may also be strongly influenced by additional parame-
ters specific to social contexts. That is, individuals with similar
non-social RA may still make different decisions within social
trust exchanges (Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Karlan, 2005; Houser
et al., 2010). Such parameters can function as trust-amplifiers
or trust-inhibitors (Fehr, 2009). For instance, an agent might
choose to invest in another out of pure altruism, even if the part-
ner is entirely unknown (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox, 2004).
Alternatively, social preferences may incorporate the disutility of
interpersonal betrayal or exploitation, and thus inhibit trusting
behavior, independent of risk, or regret aversion (Bohnet et al.,
2008).
The tools of cognitive neuroscience have provided some evi-
dence that trust and non-social risk preferences are neurobiolog-
ically dissociable. Intranasal administration of oxytocin increases
trusting behavior while risk preferences remained unchanged
(Kosfeld et al., 2005), suggesting that oxytocin is acting on param-
eters that are independent of risk. Neural correlates of risk and
trust have previously been examined separately, identifying par-
tially overlapping networks. Risk-related computations have been
associated with activity in insular cortex (Preuschoff et al., 2008),
amygdala (De Martino et al., 2006), striatum, anterior cingulate,
and parietal cortex (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Huettel et al.,
2006; Christopoulos et al., 2009), while trust-related computa-
tions have been associated with activity in striatum, insula, and
prefrontal cortex (McCabe et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2005; King-
Casas et al., 2005, 2008; Tomlin et al., 2006; Krueger et al., 2007;
Chiu et al., 2008).
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To examine the common and separable features of decision-
making under risk in social and non-social contexts, we employed
two investment tasks: one in which the outcome is determined by
a social partner (trust game) and a second in which the outcome
is determined by a random process (non-social gamble). The
values and prior probabilities associated with different options
were known to the participant and did not differ between the
social and non-social conditions. We utilized a standard microe-
conomic behavioral model along with functional magnetic res-
onance (fMRI) to compare behavioral and neuronal differences
between social and non-social conditions within subjects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-eight right-handed participants with a mean age of 26 yrs
(SD= 7 yrs; F = 23) were recruited from the Houstonmetropoli-
tan area. All participants consented to participation through a
protocol approved by the Institutional Review Board of Baylor
College of Medicine. Data from five participants were excluded
prior to individual and group level analysis due to excessive head
movement (>3mmmovement across the x, y, and z dimensions)
(Friston et al., 1995), and three participants with extreme risk
aversion parameters were excluded (detailed in Analysis section
below).
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
Each participant made 86 decisions divided in two blocks, and
order of blocks was balanced across subjects (see Figure 1). In a
“social risk” block, individuals played 43 single-shot trust games
(Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Berg et al., 1995). All participants
played the investor role. In each trial, participants were endowed
with $5–$15, and could (i) keep the endowment (certain out-
come) or (ii) invest the endowment in a second player (risky
outcome). Trustees were depicted using neutral face images of
actual trustees from a previous study who had consented for their
images to be used as stimuli. Faces included bothmen andwomen
from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds, and pairings of
faces to options were randomized across trials to mitigate possible
learning effects and bias. In the “non-social risk” block, individu-
als similarly received endowments between $5 and $15, and were
able to either keep the endowment (certain outcome) or give up
their endowment in order to accept a risky gamble (uncertain
outcome). The outcome probabilities and values associated with
risky outcomes in the social condition were determined based
on behavior of a group of trustees making decisions in a previ-
ous session, and the distribution of outcomes in the “non-social”
condition were matched to have the same mean (10.5), second
moment (36.7), and third moment (−139.2). By explicitly reveal-
ing the probabilities associated with outcomes in both social and
non-social conditions, this design removes a common confound
of comparisons of risk and trust. That is, trust often involves out-
comes for which probabilities are at least partly unknown, while
decisions involving risk do not.
PROCEDURE
Participants were instructed that they would be making deci-
sions to keep an endowment or invest their endowment in a
risky option, either in another person (social risk condition) or
FIGURE 1 | (A) In the social condition, subjects chose between keeping the
original endowment or investing their endowment in a social partner. (B) In
the non-social condition, subjects chose between keeping the original
endowment or taking a gamble in which their payoff was determined by a
non-social probabilistic mechanism (i.e., roulette wheel). (C) Decision phase
activity was modeled across the first 4 s that options were presented
(green), while outcome-related neural activity was modeled as the
instantaneous response to the revealed outcome (purple).
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in a gamble (non-social risk condition). In addition, participants
were instructed that, in the social condition, a pie chart would
indicate the average values and frequencies of actual repayments
made by trustees in a previous session, and that repayments in
the current session would be determined based on draws from
this distribution. Participants were similarly instructed that in the
non-social condition, a pie chart would indicate the values and
probabilities of potential outcomes. Prior to scanning, partici-
pants were informed they would, in part, be compensated based
on the outcomes of three randomly chosen trials.
ANALYSIS
RA expressed during social and non-social conditions were mod-
eled using a constant relative risk aversion utility function (Pratt,
1964; Arrow, 1965; Holt and Laury, 2002), in which the utility of
money x, for x > 0 is described by:
U(x) = x
(1−r)
1 − r
where x represents the monetary value that the agent will receive
and where r represents a risk attitude parameter such that r < 0
implies risk preference, r = 0 implies risk neutrality, and r > 0
implies risk aversion. When r = 1, we used U(x) = log(x) (Pratt,
1964; Arrow, 1965; Holt and Laury, 2002).
Pr(choose A) = U
1/μ
A
U1/μA + U1/μB
where μ varies between 0 and 1 and reflects the sensitivity of
choices to the utilities associated with each option (Luce, 1959).
The nlinfit function of Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) was
used to fit parameters of the model to actual choices. For each
subject, the model was estimated 100 times for choices made in
each condition (social and non-social). Three participants for
whom estimates of r were outliers (mean greater than 1.5 stan-
dard deviations of the cohort) were excluded. These participants
chose the risky option over 80% of the trials, while the remain-
ing sample chose the risky option approximately half the time
(Mnon−social = 48.09%; SDnon−social = 21.64; Msocial = 47.31%;
SDsocial = 0.19.24), placing these subjects over 1.5 standard devi-
ations above the mean. Among the remaining 30 participants, the
average r for each subject in each condition (social, non-social)
were used as metrics of risk preference.
Functional images were acquired using a 3.0T Siemens Tim
Trio with the following parameters: echo-planar imaging, gra-
dient recalled echo; repetition time (TR) = 2 s; echo time (TE)
= 30ms; flip angle = 90◦; 34 axial slices, 4.0mm slice thickness,
220 × 220mm field of view (FoV), 64 × 64 grid, resulting in vox-
els that were 3.4 × 3.4 × 4.0mm, and hyperangulated slices were
acquired at 30◦ from AC–PC. The structural scan was acquired
using a high-resolution magnetization prepared rapid acquisition
gradient echo sequence (TR = 1200ms, TE = 2.66ms, FoV =
245mm, 1mm slice thickness, 192 slices with spatial resolution
of 1 × 1 × 1mm3).
Images were preprocessed using SPM8 (WellcomeDepartment
of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK), using default values
unless otherwise specified. Images were realigned, normalized
using parameters derived from a segmented anatomical image
coregistered to the mean EPI, and smoothed (6 × 6 × 6mm). On
the first level of the general linear model, three events of interest
were modeled within each trial: 4 s presentation of options; onset
of wait period; onset of decision outcome. Events were mod-
eled separately for the following trial types and convolved with
a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF): risky social
decision; certain social decision; risky non-social decision; certain
non-social decision. Second level, random effects analyses were
performed as specified below.
RESULTS
Estimates of RA in the social condition were strongly related
to estimates of RA in the non-social condition across subjects
(Spearman  = 0.60, p < 0.001). In both conditions, participants
as a whole were risk averse (RAnon−social = 0.54, SD = 0.38;
RAsocial = 0.59, SD = 0.32). To assess the extent to which RA
differed between social and non-social contexts, we calculated
an index of social risk sensitivity: SRS = RAsocial–RAnon−social
for each subject. Positive values of SRS (+SRS) signify that the
participant exhibits higher risk aversion when a social partner
determined the outcome of a risky choice compared to when
the outcome was determined by a non-social gamble process.
Similarly, negative values of SRS (−SRS) indicate greater risk
aversion when the outcome was determined by a non-social
versus social process.
To examine risk aversion for social relative to non-social con-
texts, we compared 16 individuals with +SRS to 14 individuals
with −SRS. To confirm that these subgroups indeed differed in
risk aversion preference across social and nonsocial conditions,
a two-way, repeated measures analysis of variance with GROUP
(+SRS, −SRS) and CONDITION (social, non-social) was per-
formed. While no significant effects of GROUP or CONDITION
were identified, a significant GROUP × CONDITION inter-
action [F(1, 28) = 17.51, P < 0.001] confirmed that risk aver-
sion preferences for social and non-social options differed
between the two subgroups. Within the +SRS group, RAsocial was
greater than RAnon−social (Wilcoxon Z = +3.5; P < 0.001) and
within the –SRS group, RAnon−social was greater than RAsocial
(Wilcoxon Z = −3.3; P < 0.001).
To identify neural correlates of social risk sensitivity during
the decision-making phase of the task, we examined hemody-
namic activity within a three-way ANOVA analysis. Specifically,
we restricted our analysis to a region-of-interest (ROI) anal-
ysis that included the left amygdala as previous reports have
implicated this region in both social and risky decision-making
processes (Coricelli et al., 2005; Hsu et al., 2005; DeMartino et al.,
2006; Seymour and Dolan, 2008; Weber and Huettel, 2008). The
WFU_Pickatlas (Lancaster et al., 1997) was used to generate an
anatomical ROI of the left amygdala (with a dilation factor of 1).
Based on this anatomical ROI, eighty-six voxels were included.
A significant effect of GROUP (+SRS, −SRS) × CONDITION
(social, non-social) × CHOICE (risky option, certain option) on
hemodynamic activity was identified in left amygdala (Figure 2A;
coordinates: −24, −2, −29; P(FWE, small volume correction) < 0.05,
z-value = 4.43. Figures 2A and B illustrate how amygdala activity
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FIGURE 2 | (A) A significant effect of the three-way interaction of GROUP
(+SRS, −SRS) × CONDITION (social, non-social) × CHOICE (risky option,
certain option) was identified in hemodynamic activity in left amygdala
(P(FWE, svc) < 0.05; peak voxel coordinates: −24, −2, −29). (B) Beta weights
of GROUP × CONDITION × CHOICE at the peak voxel illustrated in panel A.
Participants who were more risk averse in the social condition (+SRS)
exhibited lower amygdala activity prior to choosing risky relative to certain
options in the non-social condition. In contrast, participants who were more
risk averse in the non-social condition (−SRS) exhibited lower amygdala
activity prior to choosing risky relative to certain options in the social condition.
varies by SRS group, condition, and choice. In three of four con-
ditions, amygdala activity is consistent with the SRS bias, despite
no overall effects of condition (social vs non-social). For instance,
among the subgroup that preferred social over non-social risk
(−SRS), greater amygdala activity was observed when choos-
ing the certain versus risky option in the social condition, and
the risky versus certain option in the non-social condition. This
pattern also holds true for the preference congruent condition
among subjects preferring non-social risk: greater amygdala activ-
ity was observed in the certain relative to risky option in the
non-social condition among subjects in the +SRS group. The
only exception to this pattern is for the preference incongruent
condition in the +SRS group.
To examine differential sensitivity to reward in social and
non-social contexts, we analyzed the hemodynamic activity
at the onset of decision outcomes. We first contrasted high-
reward outcomes with low-reward outcomes following risky
choices. Consistent with previous studies (Knutson et al., 2001;
O’Doherty, 2004; Tobler et al., 2008), hemodynamic activity in
the ventral striatum was greater following high-reward outcomes
relative to low-reward outcomes across subjects (Figure 3A; 9,
11, −11, P(FWE, whole brain correction) < 0.05, z-value = 5.91; −12,
8, −11, P(FWE, whole brain correction) < 0.05, z-value = 5.2). An
anatomically defined region was used to further examine reward-
related activity as a function of group (+SRS, −SRS) and source
of outcome (social, non-social). Specifically, the WFU_Pickatlas
(Lancaster et al., 1997) was used to generate an anatomical
ROI that includes bilateral caudate, putamen, and globus pal-
lidus (with a dilation factor of 2). Based on this anatomical
ROI, 4182 voxels were included. A significant two-way inter-
action revealed that individuals who were more risk averse in
social relative to non- social contexts (+SRS) exhibited greater
striatal activity following social relative to non-social outcomes,
while the −SRS group showed greater striatal activity following
non-social relative to social outcomes (Figure 3B; 12, 5, −17,
P(FWE, svc) < 0.05, z-value = 4.33).
DISCUSSION
The present study examines behavioral and neuronal differences
between evaluating and acting on two sources of risk: one in
which outcomes depend on a random non-social process and
one in which outcomes depend on the action of another social
agent. Values of outcomes and their associated probabilities were
known and indistinguishable across social and non-social treat-
ments, allowing us to attribute treatment-related differences to
the social or non-social source of risk alone.
Behaviorally, we found that RA in social and non-social con-
texts were correlated across subjects, which is consistent with the
notion that social risk preferences are in part accounted for by risk
preferences in non-social contexts. Nevertheless, there is a large
majority of unexplained variance that may be accounted for by
the distinct risk preferences in social and non-social contexts. In
this paper, we focus on this distinction and systematically relate
it to neural activity (Figures 2 and 3). From our perspective, the
partial concordance and partial discordance of risk parameters
observed in our data nicely contributes to the ongoing debate
over the shared and unshared variance of risk preference in social
versus non-social domains. The correlational result showing that
social and non-social RA are related provides support for the
notion that trusting behavior is strongly influenced by non-social
preferences for risk. This result is consistent with field studies,
including Karlan (2005) who found that villagers in Peru who
entrust more money in a trust game are also more likely to save
less and default more often on loans. Yet other studies (Eckel
and Wilson, 2004; Houser et al., 2010) suggest that RA and trust
behavior are not strongly related. It could be argued that the sim-
ilarity between the attitudes toward social and non-social risk
is experimentally imposed, as the alteration between non-social
and social conditions might prime the subjects to face the social
situation as a non-social gamble, or vice versa. However, this
suggestion is challenged by two patterns of results.
First, neuroimaging differences between the social and non-
social conditions, during both decision and outcomes phases
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Differential sensitivity to reward in social and non-social
contexts was observed in the ventral striatum during the presentation of
outcome, with higher activity following high-reward outcomes relative to
low-reward outcomes (P(FWE, whole brain correction) < 0.05, peak voxel
coordinates: 9, 11, −11). (B) Beta weights of GROUP × OUTCOME
interaction at peak voxel within an anatomically-defined region of interest
including caudate, putamen, and globus pallidus (P(FWE, svc) < 0.05, peak
voxel coordinates: 12, 5, −17). A significant two-way interaction revealed that
individuals who were more risk averse in non-social contexts (−SRS)
exhibited greater striatal activity following non-social outcomes, individuals
that were more risk averse in the social contexts (+SRS) showed greater
striatal activity following social outcomes.
suggest that participants differentiated social and non-social
decisions. Consistent with previous studies contrasting social
and non-social choice, Table 1 illustrates that greater activity
was identified in bilateral fusiform, medial orbitofrontal cortex,
bilateral amygdala, and posterior cingulate during the decision
phase of the social relative to non-social condition, while greater
activity was identified in medial prefrontal cortex during the
outcome phase.
Second, substantial variability in computed risk aversion
between conditions was found across subjects (+SRS and −SRS),
and this variability was systematically related to neural activity
across subjects during both decisions (Figure 2) and outcomes
(Figure 3). Thus, the suggestion that neural computations of risk
in social and non-social contexts is isomorphic, is only partially
supported by the current data.
A number of behavioral studies have suggested systematic
discordance between social and non-socially determined risk.
Bohnet et al. (2008) found that participants in six countries had
different risk acceptance frequencies for gambles determined by
“nature” versus a human partner. Such differences have been
Table 1 | Social > Non-Social Contrast.
Region MNI coordinates Peak
x y z Cluster Z PFWE
DECISION PHASE
R fusiform gyrus 42 −52 −17 1006 7.52 0.001
R parahippocampal gyrus 21 −7 −11 273 5.97 0.001
L fusiform gyrus −39 −46 −20 683 5.90 0.001
R precuneus 3 −58 31 669 5.85 0.001
L medial frontal gyrus −9 44 −17 431 5.25 0.006
L superior frontal gyrus −6 56 28 581 5.12 0.011
R uncus 36 −4 −35 28 4.99 0.022
R middle temporal gyrus 54 −7 −17 400 4.95 0.028
L inferior frontal gyrus −24 35 −29 11 4.77 0.058
OUTCOME PHASE
L medial frontal gyrus −6 56 16 38 5.78 0.001
L rectal gyrus −3 38 −20 19 5.30 0.004
L precuneus −6 −52 31 17 5.03 0.013
L middle temporal gyrus −45 −64 22 2 5.01 0.014
R parahippocampal gyrus 18 −7 −14 2 4.91 0.022
R superior temporal gyrus 48 −58 19 6 4.90 0.024
R superior temporal gyrus 54 −58 16 1 4.75 0.045
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primarily attributed to two factors: (i) other-regarding prefer-
ences over the allocation of resources (see Rabin, 1993; Fehr
and Schmidt, 2002) and (ii) aversion to either betrayal (Bohnet
and Zeckhauser, 2004) or exploitation (Fehr et al., 2005). Other-
regarding preferences can be quantified by the utility gained or
lost by the allocation of resources to others. Thus, the decision-
maker might choose to send money to a social partner because of
increased utility accrued by the simple act of sharing, regardless
of any expectation of repayment. On the other hand, a growing
body of research indicates that betrayal aversion, a social coun-
terpart of regret aversion, can deeply influence social behavior
(Koehler and Gershoff, 2003; Aimone and Houser, 2012; Bohnet
et al., 2008). In this account, betrayal by a social partner confers
additional disutility beyond the monetary loss, and the potential
for this disutility leads to greater risk aversion in social contexts.
While the separable contribution of each of these factors to the
social risk sensitivity observed here cannot be assessed within the
current design, the joint utility, and disutility leading to either
greater or lesser risk aversion in the social condition is evident
in limbic activity during the decision phase of the task.
Our neuroimaging findings indicate that differences in RA
exhibited by the SRS subgroups depend on differential functional
amygdala responses to social and non-social risk. During the
decision phase, the amygdala biases behavioral choices in accor-
dance with the underlying social preferences: participants who
are socially risk averse show reduced amygdala activity preceding
risky non-social choices, but not risky social choices. In contrast,
social risk-preferring participants had reduced amygdala activ-
ity before risky social choices, but not risky non-social choices.
This pattern is reminiscent of the functional role of amygdala in
cognitive biases modulated by emotional parameters. For exam-
ple, De Martino et al. (2006) identified that sensitivity to framing
effects (i.e., behavioral changes to isomorphic gambles presented
in a positive or negative light) is mediated by amygdala activity.
In our experiment, the social and non-social gambles are isomor-
phic; however, emotional factors such as betrayal aversion and
fairness considerations might enter the decision equation thus
biasing the behavioral choices. Further, individual differences in
social preferences over the allocation of resources has also been
shown to scale with activity in the amygdala, suggesting that
other-regarding preferences contribute the additional utility or
disutility reflected in the behavioral +SRS and –SRS subgroups,
respectively (see also Haruno and Frith, 2010).
Hemodynamic responses in the ventral striatum to the out-
come of decisions has typically been associated with predic-
tion errors, signaling differences between expected value and
observed value at decision outcomes, and the pattern observed
here is consistent with such findings (Glimcher, 2011). In addi-
tion, both Fleissbach et al. (2007) and Tricomi et al. (2010)
demonstrated that striatal responses at the outcome of social
decisions are mediated by social comparison considerations.
Thus, the increased responsivity of this region during the pref-
erence incongruent condition (social in +SRS; non-social in
−SRS), suggests that social risk sensitivity is related to increased
evaluation of social outcomes. If so, it provides support for
the idea that betrayal/exploitation aversion plays an impor-
tant role in the observed SRS biases. That is, the influence of
betrayal/exploitation aversion is most likely to be evident at the
outcomes of the decision, when the betrayal (or not) is revealed.
Although these patterns of results indicate that underlying
social preferences potentially can influence choice behavior over
and above pure risk preferences, there are some potential lim-
itations to consider regarding the interpretation of our find-
ings. Specifically, it might be possible that the differences in RA
between conditions (social and non-social) could be attributed to
perceptual features of stimuli that differ between conditions, yet
are not primarily due to the social versus non-social nature of the
two conditions. However, the 3-way interaction observed in the
amygdala reflects a further differentiation of risky relative to cer-
tain options, which is unlikely to be accounted for by differences
between social and nonsocial condition that are unrelated to risk.
In addition, the amygdala results were found using ROI analysis
and were not whole brain corrected. We used this method as it
is generally accepted by the larger scientific community given the
small size of this brain structure (De Martino et al., 2006; Haruno
and Frith, 2010).
In conclusion, these findings suggest that even in socially mini-
mal situations, investment decisions differ according to the source
of uncertainty. This implies not only that decision axioms can
be robustly violated when the social element enters the equation
but that trust should not be treated us a unitary concept. Social
predispositions reflected in amygdala activity during the decision
phase as well as differential evaluative mechanisms during the
reward outcome phase can lead to diverging behaviors. Future
research may establish the underlying factors of individual differ-
ences in social responses as well as isolate the effects of pure RA,
betrayal aversion, and altruistic considerations on trust behavior.
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